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ABSTRACT 
The United States’ investment in southern border security has consistently been a 
topic of discussion regarding technological improvements and measurements of 
effectiveness. There have been multiple failed programs designed to combine 
infrastructure, personnel, and technology, ranging from the America’s Shield 
Initiative (ASI) to the Secure Borders Initiative Network (SBInet). These efforts have 
resulted in billions of dollars of wasted funding. The latest initiative, named the 
Southwest Border Technology Plan, claims to use lessons learned from previous 
failures and focuses on integrating systems tailored to individual sectors of the border. 
A related issue is the use of apprehension rates and other passive metrics as the 
measures of effectiveness for the security of the southern border, continuing the 
historical inconsistency of inaccurate reporting methods. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has recognized the problem of inadequate measurement 
and is developing new methods with the assistance of improved data captured with 
biometric systems; however, the issue of inaccurate reporting remains. An alternate 
and more active option to consider for measuring security effectiveness is red 
teaming. This thesis explores the following questions: what technologies are 
currently utilized for border security and how can their effectiveness be measured? 
And, can red teaming be used to improve on existing measures of 
effectiveness? 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States’ investment in southern border security has consistently been a 
topic of discussion regarding technological improvements and measurements of 
effectiveness. There have been multiple failed programs designed to combine 
infrastructure, personnel, and technology ranging from the America’s Shield Initiative 
(ASI) to the Secure Borders Initiative Network (SBInet). These efforts have resulted in 
billions of dollars of wasted funding. The latest initiative, named the Southwest Border 
Technology Plan, claims to use lessons learned from previous failures and focuses on 
integrating systems tailored to individual sectors of the border. A related issue is the use of 
apprehension rates and other passive metrics as the measures of effectiveness for the 
security of the southern border, continuing the historical inconsistency of inaccurate 
reporting methods. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recognized the 
problem of inadequate measurement and is developing new methods with the assistance of 
improved data captured with biometric systems; however, the issue of inaccurate reporting 
remains. An alternate and more active option to consider for measuring security 
effectiveness is red teaming. This thesis explores the following questions: what 
technologies are currently utilized for border security and how can their effectiveness be 
measured? And, can red teaming be used to improve on existing measures of effectiveness? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Border security is a major priority for the current presidential administration and 
has been for decades. On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13767 
and charged the Department of Homeland Security with gaining total operational control 
(OPCON) of the United States’ borders. Section 2 of the executive order defines 
operational control as “The prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, 
including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, 
2 
and other contraband.”1 However, this new order is not the first time DHS has been charged 
with acquiring OPCON of the United States’ southern border. OPCON was used as a goal 
by DHS from 2004 to 2010 during an effort to measure the qualitative effect of enforcement 
at the southern border in order to “determine the proper mixture of personnel, technology, 
and infrastructure to deny or deter illegal entry into the United States.”2 OPCON was later 
dropped as a goal because of the lack of empirical evidence of success, as reported by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other organizations.3 
Over the last two decades DHS has tracked several performance metrics for border 
security only to drop them soon after. From 2001–2004, optimum deterrence was used as 
a measure of effectiveness, meaning that success would be demonstrated when increased 
security measures no longer resulted in increased apprehensions. In 2005, OPCON became 
the new measure and showed success as each mile along the border was controlled by 
Border Patrol agents with the ability to detect, identify, and respond to illegal activity. After 
operational control was dropped, the apprehension rate became the measure in 2011. 
Though the apprehension rate was only intended to be the interim measure until 2013, 
while DHS developed a comprehensive measure called the border conditions index.4 The 
border conditions index was intended to stand as the sole measure of border security by 
tracking estimated flows at entry ports, the quality of life in regions around the border, 
public safety, and wait times for legal flows at ports of entry.5 However, the measure did 
not meet the demands required for a single comprehensive measure and its development 
was discontinued in 2013. Therefore, the apprehension rate still stands as the primary 
measurement today. 
                                                 
1 Exec. Order, No. 13767, 3 C.F.R. 8793 (2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/
30/2017-02095/border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, Efforts by DHS to Estimate Southwest Border Security between 
Ports of Entry (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 18, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0914_estimates-of-border-security.pdf. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, 18. 
4 Carla N Argueta, Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry, CRS Report No. R44386 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf. 
5 Argueta, 3. 
3 
The inability to accurately measure the effectiveness of technology improvements 
at the border significantly affects the ability of DHS to acquire additional infrastructure 
and technology.6 The data currently offered is incomplete, often unreliable, and easily 
subject to misinterpretation.7 The acquisition, placement, and measuring of technological 
effectiveness is a necessity for proving that a given project is worth continuing. According 
to a 2007 RAND testimony, new border security technologies are extremely expensive and 
it is imperative that the level of performance gained from them justify the cost of 
developing and deploying them.8 While the apprehension rate used by Border Patrol is 
simple to track, according to a study by the Bipartisan Policy Center tracking the rate of 
apprehensions does not indicate whether or not Border Patrol is meeting the goal of 
deterring or preventing illegal entry.9  
A new metric used by Border Patrol in an attempt to demonstrate technological 
improvements is “technology assists.” Technological assists consist of any apprehension 
that occurs where assistance was provided to an agent by a variety of assets, such as a 
ground sensor or an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. A major issue is the fact that the data is 
dependent on reporting by individual agents who have received very little guidance by 
management on how to categorize inputs or understanding of the purpose behind the 
collection of data. An investigation performed by the GAO in 2017 proved the data set to 
be inaccurate by sampling the output and finding sufficient mistakes to render the 
compilation of data useless.10  
                                                 
6 Office of Inspector General, CBP’s Border Security Efforts: An Analysis of Southwest Border 
Security Between the Ports of Entry (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General DHS, 2017), 13, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-39-Feb17.pdf. 
7 Office of Inspector General, 13. 
8 Brian A Jackson, Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and 
Adaptive Threats (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 3, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.pdf. 
9 Bryan Roberts, Measuring the Metrics: Grading the Government on Immigration Enforcement 
(Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2015), 15, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/BPC_Immigration_MeasuringEnforcement.pdf. 
10 Rebecca Gambler, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance 
Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-18-119 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2017), 30–32, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688666.pdf. 
4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of published research and expert 
opinions on the methods the Department of Homeland Security can use to measure the 
effectiveness of technology at the United States southern border. Congress directed DHS 
to provide detailed reporting on southwest border security through the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2017. The act requires DHS to provide metrics capable of measuring 
the effectiveness of between ports of entry security as well as the data and methodology 
supporting the measure.11 The Office of Immigration Statistics in DHS focused on three 
main categories to measure security effectiveness between the ports of entry: 1) the 
apprehension and interdiction rate, which uses apprehension survey data, interdiction 
effectiveness, total interdiction rates, and partial apprehension rates; 2) the deterrence rate, 
which uses the recidivism rate, deterrence survey data, and measures of illegal inflows; and 
3) border crossing costs, which uses survey data on smuggler fees.12 However, according 
to the most recent Border Security Metrics Report from DHS, research on these methods 
is “still a work in progress and DHS is not able to validate the modeling assumptions or 
quantify the uncertainty within the new estimation procedures.”13 
1. Measuring Border Security Effectiveness  
The common issue among scholars and other professionals is that they do not agree 
on what the best method is to measure border security effectiveness. After a review of 
multiple GAO reports, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, RAND studies, and 
other documents, it is apparent that most of the literature focuses on indirect metric data 
collection over long periods of time to measure effectiveness instead of a more direct 
method. For example, RAND suggestions are: capture-recapture methods that tag 
apprehended individuals and determine immigration flow by their recaptures over time; 
sampling border segments by placing assets in areas with low, medium, and high flow and 
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, Efforts by DHS, 1. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, 3. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics 
Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 7, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/BSMR_OIS_2016.pdf. 
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calculating apprehensions; community surveys with questions that promote honesty; and 
lastly, synthetic modeling based on migrant risk and costs of “coyote” services.14 The 
Bipartisan Policy Center recommends using methodology built from data that is already 
collected by Border Patrol, the first being known-flow data which combines the 
apprehension rate, individuals who give up while attempting to cross, and those known to 
get away. The second method is analysis of the recidivism rate, which is the percentage of 
border crossers caught more than once during the same fiscal year. The third and final 
method is migrant surveys focused on asking how many times individuals have been 
apprehended and how many attempts it took to cross.15 As noted in the previous section 
DHS currently uses apprehension rates as a measure of border security effectiveness. As 
far back as its legacy organization the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
department has recognized the challenges involved with relying on the apprehension rate 
for measuring effectiveness, but as stated earlier, they are still working on refining the 
estimation techniques.16  
DHS did adopt a few recommendations from outside agencies in its 2018 Border 
Security Metrics report, which is a step in the right direction from previous accounts of its 
reluctance to accept outside recommendations. But it still falls short in meeting the basic 
criteria established by the Bipartisan Policy Center report for good performance 
measurements.17 A few requirements for this measurement criteria established by 
individuals from public administration and policy analysis are as follows: 1) measures 
should be meaningful, clear and readily understandable; 2) measures should be capable of 
being used by government agencies to inform decisions and resource allocation should be 
timely and actionable; and 3) measures should be stable over time.18 Though border 
                                                 
14 Andrew Morral, Henry Willis, and Peter Brownell, Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between 
Ports of Entry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 11, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
occasional_papers/OP328.html. 
15 Roberts, Measuring the Metrics, xi. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics 
Report, 7. 
17 Roberts, Measuring the Metrics, vii. 
18 Roberts, 17. 
6 
security data has been public since 1950, there has never been a consistent measurement 
other than the apprehension rate.19 Because the apprehension rate can appear to indicate 
successful performance whether the rate is rising or falling, it is not a valuable tool, but it 
is essentially the only outcome measure that the public and Congress have to measure 
border security effectiveness.20  
Multiple GAO and CRS reports dating back to 2003 have concluded that DHS has 
instituted some programs that align with recommendations. But as the Inspector General 
stated in the 2017 OIG report, CBP still faces challenges with measuring effectiveness of 
its programs and operations in regards to securing the southwest border.  
2. Red Teaming  
Scholars and other experts have proposed very few direct methods for measuring 
border security effectiveness that would meet the criteria discussed above. Carla Argueta 
provides a few recommendations in the final section of her 2016 CRS report such as 
population surveys, regression models, and stratified samplings by placing surveillance 
resources to test certain areas, but she does not offer any detail on how they would be 
conducted. In the final sentence, however, she does mention red teaming as a method for 
detection in a sampled area and having migrants or agents attempt border crossings in order 
to establish interdiction probabilities.21  
Red teaming encompasses a multitude of structured tests used to determine the 
intentions and capabilities of a competitor or institution using alternative analysis, 
penetration tests, and simulations to make a better-informed decision. However, other than 
the final sentence in the CRS report, there has been no mention about red teaming as a 
direct testing method for surveillance technology effectiveness. In a 2007 RAND 
testimony, Brian Jackson makes a recommendation to use red teaming as a means of testing 
                                                 
19 Roberts, 10. 
20 Edward Alden, Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Enforcement (Washington, DC: Council on 
Foreign Relation, 2013), 3, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/03/
Alden_Border_Security_Testimony_03-14-13%20-%20Final.pdf. 
21 Argueta, Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry, 18. 
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technology prior to broad implementation with a team of individuals capable of discovering 
new ways to penetrate them.22 While this is useful in ensuring that technologies will 
perform over time, the method does not demonstrate surveillance technology effectiveness 
in a given area before and after deployment of surveillance technology.  
Not focusing on the potential gains offered by red teaming could be a missed 
opportunity for DHS. An important point from the 9–11 Commission report states that red 
teaming is “notably lacking within the homeland security and intelligence elements of the 
Federal government.”23 The Department of Defense has, however, integrated red teaming 
in decision making for acquisitions and testing for years. A 2003 report on the status of red 
teaming stated that red teaming in the DoD plays an important role in training, concept 
development, and experimentation both during the experimental phase and after 
implementation. The report also found red teaming useful in the testing of secure systems 
where an opportunity does not usually exist, such nuclear storage and transportation.24  
Though the name “red teaming” is new, the concept has been used by NATO for 
years under the name of “alternative analysis,” and by the U.S. Naval War College under 
the title of “war gaming” as far back as 1923.25 After witnessing the benefits of red 
teaming, the 2003 Defense Science Board recommended a strong presence of red teaming 
within the DoD but also suggested the development of a guide and coursework to 
demonstrate best practices.26 Such a guide was released by the United States in 2005 for 
the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, and a similar guide was produced 
by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. However, the guides only act as an academic 
introduction for individuals new to red teaming and do not provide technical guidance for 
the use of red teaming. The guides provide assistance with understanding the history of red 
                                                 
22 Jackson, Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and Adaptive 
Threats, 2007, 7. 
23 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2004), 352, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
24 Department of Defense, The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2003), 3, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/redteam.pdf. 
25 Department of Defense, 31. 
26 Department of Defense, 1. 
8 
teaming, the successful conditions of red teaming, how to apply red teaming techniques, 
and highlighting red teaming’s potential benefits, but they remain at a very abstract level 
and do not provide specific examples of red teaming used in history. The Ministry of 
Defence guide states that red teaming is prevalent in reducing risk and problem solving for 
commercial enterprises, such as IBM, and other governmental agencies such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency.27 However, neither guide specifies how red teaming is used in these 
fields.  
Recent literature on red teaming offers several more specific examples of how red 
teaming has been used in U.S. national security. Two examples are the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) covert red team that tested and found airport security deficiencies 
prior to 9/11 and the simulations conducted by the Navy SEALs prior to the 2011 raid on 
Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.28 The recommendations provided from these examples are 
applicable to both government and private sector requirements, and while they provide 
useful outcomes, the advice from the reports is not always taken. For example, after Micah 
Zenko describes a decade’s worth of successful red teaming penetrations of airports across 
the globe in his book Red Team, he writes about the 400 pages’ worth of vulnerability 
reporting that was dismissed by leadership within the FAA prior to 9/11.29  
After reviewing the descriptions of red teaming in the private sector and DoD, it is 
apparent that the focus is on cyber security, with very little focus on physical security. The 
U.S. Army takes the lead on instructing red teaming in the DoD, but the Air Force Red 
Team program under the Air Force Directorate of Electronics and Special Programs offers 
the most relevancy to the testing of surveillance security systems at the border. Though 
there is no example provided, the 2003 DoD report states that the Air Force team 
incorporates a red vs blue interaction that evaluates and makes improvements to the 
systems of the defender, also known as the blue team. The outcomes of the tests are then 
                                                 
27 Ministry of Defence, Red Teaming Guide, 2nd ed. (Wiltshire, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2012), ii, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142533/
20130301_red_teaming_ed2.pdf. 
28 Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 
2015). 
29 Zenko, 124. 
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used to guide decision making on technology development, provide warning in regards to 
the vulnerability of fielded technology, and shows success when the provided data has 
altered a development plan or acquisition to a better product.30 The DoD recognizes red 
teaming’s important roles in training; concept development and experimentation, both 
before and during concept development; testing the security of complex systems and 
networks; and exercising activities when there is typically no option to perform real tests, 
such as responding to nuclear weapon mishaps.31 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Dating back to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, outside agency 
reports32 and DHS internal studies have recognized that the reliance on alien apprehension 
rates as the measurement of effectiveness between ports of entry security is ineffective, 
and efforts to find new measurements continue.33 As stated by the Office of Inspector 
General for DHS, “CBP does not measure the effectiveness of its programs and operations 
well; therefore, it continues to invest in programs and act without the benefit of the 
feedback needed to help ensure it uses resources wisely and improves border security.”34 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the method of red teaming is a direct measure 
of surveillance technology effectiveness and offers a clear picture for both the policy 
makers and the agents charged with enforcing border security. A dedicated red team much 
like the one established in the FAA prior to 9/11 or dedicated simulation team can perform 
penetration testing of border sectors. The results from these teams provides capture rate 
data both before and after technology deployment as well as offers continued testing to 
improve implementation for years after deployment. Instead of relying on passive data 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense, The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities, 11. 
31 Department of Defense, 3. 
32 Marc R Rosenblum, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, CRS 
Report No. R42138 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 27, 
https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/R42138.pdf. 
33 Department of Homeland Security, Efforts by DHS, 1. 
34 Office of Inspector General, CBP’s Border Security Efforts: An Analysis of Southwest Border 
Security Between the Ports of Entry, 2. 
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collected over a period of time, this thesis argues that DHS should consider a red teaming 
option for measuring the effectiveness of improved surveillance technology at the border.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis has three main goals: (1) to take a brief historical look at the attempts 
DHS has made to measure effectiveness of border security initiatives and better understand 
the resulting billions of dollars in wasted investment; (2) to provide an overview of the 
technology currently used at the border and how its effectiveness is measured; and finally 
(3) to describe red teaming and develop a method similar to that used by the FAA or other 
simulations that DHS could use to test technology efficiency at the southern border.  
In order to meet the first goal, the primary sources and materials used were reviews 
by the Office of Inspector General grading DHS and assessing the history of 
mismanagement with recommendations. The second goal is met with GAO and 
Congressional Research Service reports that assess the technology at the border and 
provide feedback on the need to improve data quality in order to better assess effectiveness. 
The Bipartisan Policy Center recommendations tied with internal reviews and testimonies 
of senior DHS leadership describing future actions to better measure effectiveness were 
used to meet this goal as well. The third goal was met with the U.S. military and Ministry 
of Defence red teaming guides, and the Department of Defense’s The Role and Status of 
DoD Red Teaming Activities report to provide an introduction and outline to red teaming; 
while literature focused on red teaming such as Micah Zenko’s Red Team: How to Succeed 
by Thinking Like the Enemy provided a baseline for physical penetration and computer 
simulation red teams.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis includes five chapters. Following Chapter I’s introduction and literature 
review, Chapter II provides a background on the history of performance measurements and 
failures in order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the significance for 
effective measurement. Chapter III describes the current surveillance technology at the 
border and the more recent measures of effectiveness proposed by scholars and outside 
agencies. Chapter IV provides an overview of what is red teaming, requirements for 
11 
successful red teaming, and examples of physical and simulated red team models used in 
similar environments. Chapter V uses the pre-9/11 FAA red team as a case study to provide 
an outline for red teaming as well as lessons learned for future red teams. Chapter VI 
concludes with a summary of the findings and provides a recommendation for DHS to use 
for future measurements of surveillance technology effectiveness. 
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II. THE BACKGROUND AND THE PROBLEM 
In order for DHS to maintain Congressional funding for surveillance technology, 
there must be measures of effectiveness that help justify the security expenditures.35 This 
leads to the question, how can the effectiveness of surveillance technology at the United 
States southern border be measured? The importance of this question first results from the 
executive order signed by President Trump in 2017 charging DHS to gain operational 
control of the border;36 and second from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, in 
which Congress directed DHS to provide detailed reporting on the status of the southwest 
border security.37 A defining moment for Border Patrol recognizing the need for improved 
measurements to show the effectiveness of its efforts was after the failure of the SBInet. In 
2010, the Chief of Border Patrol testified that even after $3.5 billion was spent on border 
security, less than 3 percent of the border was under control.38 The ability to accurately 
identify measures of effectiveness has been recognized as critical to border control for 
decades, yet Border Patrol continues to use the number of apprehensions, a recognizably 
poor indicator, as a measurement for illegal migration flows and successful security 
implementation.39  
To provide a complete understanding of the historical problems of measuring the 
effectiveness of security at the border, the first section of this chapter begins with a 
background of the immigration enforcement system and major changes that have occurred 
to make it as large as it is today. The remaining sections discuss the previous attempts at 
measuring effectiveness, the problems with relying on apprehension rates, and finally the 
importance of reliable measurements. 
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A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. immigration enforcement system is a network of several agencies that 
include DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of State. The primary 
purpose of the immigration enforcement system is to prevent unlawful entry into the U.S. 
by arresting, detaining, and removing individuals who pose a threat to national security or 
threaten border security. DHS handles the majority of immigration functions through the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which includes the Office of Field Operations and 
the U.S. Border Patrol. While the Office of Field Operations handles the ports of entry, the 
Border Patrol prevents unauthorized entry between the ports of entry. This portion of the 
thesis focuses on the role of Border Patrol and the ways to measure the effectiveness of its 
primary mission, preventing the unlawful entry of immigrants.  
In the early 1900s, there were no specific legal channels for immigration and very 
little enforcement. The primary function of immigration officials was to process new 
arrivals, record their information, and inspect them for disqualifications such as disease.40 
The only restrictions before 1920 were directed towards Chinese immigrants who were 
banned starting in the 1880s.41 The Border Patrol was established in 1925 to enforce new 
laws that enacted quotas based on national origin. Large-scale immigration was not a 
concern until World War II when labor shortages in the agricultural industry required a 
program to import Mexican nationals. The issue with illegal immigration occurred after the 
war when the Mexican national labor quota was cut, but the need for workers still existed. 
To combat this rise in unlawful entries, President Eisenhower initiated policies to tackle 
the issue and brought Border Patrol apprehensions down through the 1950s and 1960s.42 
After the total cancelation of the labor program in 1965, the apprehension rate rose again, 
this time with the inclusion of illegal immigration from Central American countries such 
as El Salvador and Nicaragua due to civil conflict.43  
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In order to control the influx of illegal immigration, the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 was passed. This act granted legal status to many laborers as well as 
unlawful residents who had been present since 1982 but was also intended to increase 
enforcement at U.S. borders.44 When the act failed to prevent the inflow of illegal 
immigration, significant enforcement buildup occurred in the late 1990s and again in the 
late 2000s, doubling the number of Border Patrol agents, developing major fencing 
projects, and improving the technology.45 This buildup has made immigration enforcement 
an extremely large federal effort; the expenditures are roughly 50 percent of all federal law 
enforcement agencies combined, and the work-force makes up 45 percent of all federal law 
enforcement officers.46  
B. PROBLEM 
After understanding the size and extreme expenses that border security consumes, 
it is essential to look at the historical problem the U.S. government has had with developing 
measures of border security effectiveness. Immigration data has been collected by the 
federal government in the form of workflow data since 1892, and the data has been publicly 
available since the 1950s.47 The various workflow data results consisted of useful 
information such as the number of citizens inspected at ports, aliens denied entry, 
apprehensions between ports, and the number of deportations annually. The problem is that 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ceased publication of this data without 
explanation in 2002.48 The need for identifying measures of effectiveness was recognized 
well before that date by Sandia National Laboratories in 1993, which stated that measures 
are critical to controlling the border; and substantial recommendations were also made in 
a 1997 Government Accountability Office report.49 Multiple attempts were made by INS 
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between 1997 and 2000 to incorporate these methods, the first being recidivism, which is 
the percentage of border-crossers who get apprehended more than once in a year. 
Subsequent years brought the interdiction rate for illegal entry at ports and the between-
port operational effectiveness rate, which accounts for the ratio of apprehensions versus 
total entries attempted. Even with these attempts to measure effectiveness, it was 
determined that they were highly variable and did not always relate to the core missions of 
INS.50 These issues were the beginning of an era of start-and-stop performance 
measurements that would continue through the development of DHS and extend on today.  
DHS’s attempt to measure border security has led to multiple iterations of 
performance measurements. In the last 15 years, DHS has started and stopped five different 
methods and is currently refining and developing more.51 When DHS took over 
immigration functions in 2003, it canceled the INS performance measures of optimum 
deterrence and replaced them with the number of border miles considered under OPCON. 
Optimum deterrence was calculated with apprehension rates, border-related crimes, 
recidivism, smuggling fees, and property values as a measure for individual corridors along 
the border. The level at which applying increased Border Patrol agents and assets did not 
lead to increased arrests was considered reaching optimum deterrence.52 The OPCON 
replacement considered a mile to be within OPCON when Border Patrol “employed the 
proper mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure to detect, respond, and interdict 
illegal entry at the immediate border.”53 Significant changes to performance measures 
under the Obama administration led DHS to drop the OPCON performance measurement. 
Border Patrol chiefs were unable to effectively use this method to assess different border 
areas, and a mile-by-mile border assessment did not seem practical.54 The U.S. 
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Government Accountability Office stated the OPCON measure was lacking empirical 
measures and was not an effective tool.55 
The apprehension rate was intended to be used from 2011 to 2013 as an interim fix 
while DHS worked on the Border Conditions Index (BCI), but it is still used today. The 
BCI was projected to stand as the sole measure of border security by tracking estimated 
flows at entry ports, the quality of life in regions around the border, public safety, and wait 
times for legal flows at ports of entry.56 However, the measure did not meet the demands 
required for a single comprehensive measure, and its development was discontinued in 
2013.  
C. THE APPREHENSION RATE 
There are many problems with relying on the apprehension rate as a performance 
metric for border security. A Congressional Research Service report in 2012 listed three 
reasons why the apprehension rate is a poor indicator that is highly affected by other trends. 
First, the data excludes successful unauthorized alien entries, unsuccessful unauthorized 
aliens, and would-be unauthorized aliens, which leads to an incomplete picture of 
migration enforcement and total unauthorized migration. Second, apprehension data 
accounts for events instead of people; when the same person is apprehended multiple times, 
it overestimates the actual number of illegal attempts. Finally, the apprehension rate does 
not account for the economic downturns or demographic changes that occur on the other 
side of the border.57 RAND states that measures such as apprehension rates are indirect 
and unrelated to the mission of border control, which makes it an unreliable management 
tool. For the apprehension rate to be effective, the Border Patrol would need to know the 
total flow of immigrants, which is not yet possible.58  
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While the apprehension rate can be useful in some aspects, it is not adequate for 
measuring performance, especially when it can be interpreted as both a positive and a 
negative. Like any law enforcement effort, increased arrests can mean either improved 
policing that catches more criminals, or it can be the outcome of more individuals violating 
laws.59 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been known to interpret the numbers in 
both ways, with increased apprehension being a positive factor at checkpoints, while 
decreases in apprehensions represent improvements to deterrence from technology and 
staffing between ports of entry.60 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) also believes that 
less apprehensions represent improvements in security measures between ports, but since 
Border Patrol does not calculate illegal circumvention of checkpoints, the OIG argued it 
was not a suitable measure of effectiveness.61  
Even though the Border Patrol Chief stated in a 2017 testimony that the decline in 
apprehensions is an improvement, the OIG and GAO both concluded that using it as a 
performance measurement limited accountability and congressional oversight.62 Though 
it is clear that a measure that demonstrates success whether it increases or decreases has 
little use as a tool for evaluation, as of now, it is essentially the only measurement that the 
public and Congress are provided to judge the accomplishments or failures of border 
enforcement.63 A recent GAO report concluded that apprehension data does not lead to 
proper allocation decisions or program results, and until new measures are established, 
DHS and Congress can expect incomplete oversight and accountability.64 The OIG 
concluded that CBP’s inadequate or sometimes nonexistent performance measurements 
constitute an ongoing trend.65 
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D. IMPORTANCE OF MEASUREMENTS 
The previous section demonstrated the consistent inability for DHS to measure 
performance. It is also essential to understand why these performance measurements are 
so important. In order to provide policymakers and the general public with information on 
how much expenditure is enough or if the technology is making a difference, there must 
be measurements. Regarding immigration and enforcement programs that, as mentioned 
earlier, consume 50 percent of all law enforcement expenditures, proper measurements 
quickly become a topic of controversy. When it comes to measuring the performance of 
border security, three sets of data are key: inputs, outputs, and outcomes.66 An example of 
an input would be the cost of a new integrated fixed tower placed in a region. The output 
would be the documented assistance the tower provided to border patrol agents. Both the 
input and output data sets are easily measured through cost and documentation. For 
policymakers, a beneficial outcome of the investment in the tower would be to know the 
total number of illegal entries that were detected and apprehended in that area versus the 
total amount that was not, but this data is not feasibly attainable.  
The information available to policymakers for decision making is typically the 
input measures such as the number of agents deployed, the amount of funding toward 
programs, or the number of miles covered with border fencing.67 However, there are two 
reasons why the outcome measurement is needed to make decisions on how much spending 
is required or how effective a program is. First, outcome measures are capable of displaying 
the ability for DHS to meet its immigration enforcement goals of preventing illegal import 
and entry, or specifically OPCON.68 Second, outcome measures are useful in decision 
making, and public debate over the security of the border, which many believe has not 
improved since 2005.69 The 2017 OIG report states that the border is still porous, and it is 
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questionable whether or not the significant investments have made any improvements to 
border security.70 Without a proper measurement for technology investment outcomes, it 
is unlikely that policymakers and the public will agree on the state of the border, making 
the decision of how much or what should be done more difficult. 
Of the performance measures typically reported for government agencies, there are 
three that DHS should strive to meet with technology effectiveness. First, measures should 
be readily understandable, meaningful, and clear. Second, measures that inform decisions 
by government agencies for resource allocation should be actionable and timely. Third, the 
measures should be stable, consistent, reliable, and uniform over time.71 As the previous 
section shows, it is apparent that these measures are not being met by DHS.  
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III. BORDER SECURITY PROGRAMS—THEN AND NOW 
DHS has experienced a series of failures in the past, partly due to the inability to 
build metrics into program management and planning, as well as “inadequately collecting 
reliable and complete data for program performance.”72 America’s Shield Initiative (ASI) 
was initiated in 2004, and used sensors, cameras, and databases to create an Integrated 
Surveillance Intelligence System. After a review by the Government Accountability 
Office, ASI was deemed to not have effective program management elements such as 
defined roles and responsibilities and acquisition management.73 Before the program was 
set into motion, it was reevaluated and rolled into the larger SBInet that was announced by 
the DHS in 2005.74  
SBInet expanded the ASI integrated network idea to include radar/camera towers, 
ground sensors, unmanned aerial surveillance, and mobile surveillance all linked into a 
command post in contact with individual agents in the field.75 GAO audited the program 
multiple times and found that CBP was once again not following good practices regarding 
the evaluation of overall effectiveness the technology had on border security.76 After 
extreme cost overruns and no measurable benefit to border security, the Homeland Security 
Secretary canceled SBInet in January of 2011. By the time SBInet was canceled, it had cost 
taxpayers over $1 billion and covered only 53 miles of the 2000-mile southern border.77 
Within a month of canceling SBInet, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 
Plan (ATP) was announced. While this plan took a different approach to acquisition by 
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purchasing previously tested technology instead of paying for the development and 
implementation costs that SBInet incurred, there were still issues. First, CBP did not 
develop documented analysis to justify increased border surveillance technology. Second, 
there were no predefined mission benefits to meet before implementing ATP. Finally, since 
there was no assessment for the effectiveness of the already placed SBInet systems, 
management was unable to make adequate decisions to improve the ATP further.78 In 
2014, the current Southwest Border Technology Plan (SBTP) was developed, which plans 
to incorporate the ATP developments and extend them beyond Arizona to the rest of the 
border.79 
This chapter examines the current state of technology along the U.S. southern 
border, first by reviewing the Southwest Border Technology Plan and its major 
components. Next, it will describe a few recommended methods from outside organizations 
that DHS has adopted and refined as well as the primary methods that DHS is moving 
forward with as demonstrated in the 2018 DHS Metrics Report.  
A. SOUTHWEST BORDER TECHNOLOGY PLAN 
To better understand the current technology efforts at the southern border when 
discussing the performance measures, this section discusses the SBTP and its technological 
systems in more detail. Border Patrol developed the SBTP with a two-step process. First, 
teams of analysts identified the types of technology to be used for the overall plan and 
aligned them with 13 different sectors along the border that were most fitting by terrain. 
Second, the analysts narrowed the project based on the quantities of each technology type 
needed in each sector by factoring operational conditions of traffic patterns, weather, 
infrastructure, and vegetation.80 This section provides a brief overview of the seven 
primary surveillance systems used in the SBTP (see Figures 1–7). 
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Figure 1. Integrated Fixed Tower81 
Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT): The IFT is an 80-to 160-foot-tall fixed tower that 
includes a mounted radar with day and night cameras. The tower is capable of covering 
large areas of rugged terrain with a clear picture of what is being detected to prevent the 
need for sending Border Patrol agents to livestock movements or other false alarms. The 
radar and cameras send information wirelessly through microwave links to a central hub 
station where the data is monitored by Border Patrol agents that determine appropriate 
responses. The monitoring agents are able to “detect a single walking average-sized adult 
at up to 7.5 miles in both daylight and darkness.”82 The high resolution video produced is 
so specific that it can determine what the detected individual is carrying, whether it be a 
long-arm weapon or a backpack. This level of situational awareness improves the 
responding Border Patrol agent’s operational capability by informing them on what the 
hazards are before they arrive, allowing the agents to be more effective, efficient, and safe, 
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which has not always been the case.83 The IFT towers are manufactured by an Israeli based 
company called Elbit Systems and designed to be much more rugged than previously 
deployed systems, and more capable of handling the harsh dessert environments. Israel has 
deployed similar IFT towers along hundreds of miles of its Palestinian, Gaza, and Egypt 
borders in recent years.84 
 
Figure 2. Remote Video Surveillance System85 
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS): This system is much like the IFT but 
does not include a radar system and can only be mounted up to 120 feet. Highly trafficked 
and populated areas tend to over saturate radar systems like that of the IFT, making the 
RVSS the preferred option in these specific area types. While RVSS towers are currently 
in use at both the northern and southern U.S. borders, the systems are being upgraded with 
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new cameras fit for long, medium, and short-rang surveillance.86 Supplemental power is 
generated by local solar panels while the transfer of data is sent to a command and control 
center through a microwave link much like the IFT system.87 There is a relocatable variant 
that is mounted to an 80-foot-tall tower on a platform trailer that provides Border Patrol 
agents an opportunity to strategically locate the tower for a shorter period of time.88 
 
Figure 3. Unattended Ground Sensors and Imaging Sensors89 
Unattended Ground Sensors and Imaging Sensors (UGS and I-UGS): In her 
testimony, Clair Grady, the DHS Under Secretary describes UGS as “remotely monitored 
surveillance systems that detect, identify and track activity and subjects in areas not easy 
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to access or monitor with other technology.”90 Grady further states that these sensors are 
stationary when installed, but easily relocatable and concealed when necessary; and can 
track and identify the movement of humans, animals, and vehicles with the ability to 
differentiate them from each other. The information is sent to a command and control 
center as well as directly to Border Patrol agents who are carrying hand held monitors in 
the field.91 The detection capabilities provide a wide range possibilities from seismic, 
magnetic, acoustic, infrared, radar, and microwave sensors. The Imaging variant called the 
I-UGS, provides photo or video verification of the detections and enables the agents to 
perform image analyses of the data upon receipt. 
 
Figure 4. Agent Portable Surveillance System92 
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS): This system contains daylight and 
infrared cameras, radar, and a laser illuminator. The APSS provides medium-range mobile 
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surveillance and is portable by two or three agents for use in areas where more permanent 
systems are not capable of reaching.93 While a direct link is provided to agents, there is no 
link to a command and control center.94 These suitcase-based camera and radar systems 
provide Border Patrol agents improved visibility at key vantage points inaccessible by 
larger truck-mounted systems.95 
 
Figure 5. Thermal Imaging Device96 
Thermal Imaging Device (TID): This system contains a portable handheld infrared 
camera that enables border patrol agents to see up to 5 miles in dim lighting or total 
darkness in varying weather conditions from rain to dense fog and blowing dust.97 Much 
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like the APSS, these rugged portable systems provide Border Patrol agents with an 
advantage at key observation points inaccessible to larger vehicles. 
 
Figure 6. Mobile Surveillance Capability98 
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC): This truck-mounted system consists of 
daylight and infrared cameras, radar, a laser illuminator, and a laser range finder all 
mounted to a retractable 25-foot tower for long-range surveillance.99 Information is sent 
to the crew inside of the truck through multiple monitors, but no data is sent to a command 
and control center.100 The control room for the deployed agents is in the backseat, the 
passenger seat faces the rear to provide the agents access to monitors for the radar and 
camera, with a keyboard and track pad to control them. The MSCs are on a ruggedized 
vehicle capable of traversing rough terrain and maintaining a location for up to a week 
when deployed.101  
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Figure 7. Mobile Video Surveillance System102 
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS): This is a trimmed down version of the 
MSC variant and does not include radar capability. Where the MSC is designed for long-
range surveillance, the MVSS performs short and medium-range surveillance in areas with 
higher levels of activity.103 The information is sent to monitors within the cab of the truck 
and not to a command and control center.104 The MVSS provides CBP an affordable option 
to outfit standard pickup trucks with a mobile camera platform that can remain operational 
for up to 72 hours without charge or be removed from the truck and temporarily deployed 
with a solar panel for power. One truck is capable of placing and monitoring multiple 
MVSS systems at a time as long as it remains within a few miles of the mobile camera 
systems therefore drastically increasing the coverage capability of each border patrol 
team.105  
                                                 
102 Source: Gambler, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance 
Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness, 11. 
103 Grady, testimony on Bang for the Border Security Buck. 
104 Gambler, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance Technologies but 
Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness, 11. 
105 “The Eagle MVSS,” Tactical Micro, 2, accessed September 9, 2019, 
http://www.tacticalmicro.com/products/MVSS_CATALOG.pdf. 
30 
These systems make up an extensive and highly capable network of sensors 
designed to detect and track people and vehicles approaching or crossing the border. In the 
CBP article “Further Reflections” a Border Patrol agent explains that these surveillance 
technologies not only improve officer safety with each response but they drastically reduce 
the time required for each incident in the field; where interdictions previously took between 
8–10 hours, they now are typically resolved in less than an hour.106 However, there are 
still unanswered questions; what is the ultimate impact of these systems—and how can that 
outcome be measured? These issues will be discussed in the following sections…  
B. RECENT MEASURES  
There have been many recommendations for performance measurements of border 
security to DHS in the last few years, and DHS has adopted or refined many of them. This 
section describes a few recommended methods as well as the methods DHS is moving 
forward with in the 2018 DHS Metrics Report.  
In 2011, RAND suggested four “promising methods” to relieve DHS from relying 
on the number of apprehensions: capture-recapture methods that tag apprehended 
individuals and determine immigration flow by their recaptures over time; sampling border 
segments by placing assets in areas with low, medium, and high flow and calculating 
apprehensions; community surveys with questions that promote honesty; and synthetic 
modeling based on migrant risk and costs of “coyote” services.107  
In 2015, The Bipartisan Policy Center recommended improving methodology on 
data that is already collected by Border Patrol. The first recommendation was known-flow 
data, which combines the apprehension rate, individuals who give up while attempting to 
cross, and those known to get away. The second method is an analysis of the recidivism 
rate, which is the percentage of border crossers caught more than once within the same 
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fiscal year. The third and final method is migrant surveys focused on asking how many 
times individuals have been apprehended and how many attempts it took to cross.108 
1. Known Flow Data 
The known-flow data, also known as the effectiveness rate, has been collected since 
the 1990s to analyze the performance of enforcement operations in preventing illegal 
entry.109 The known-flow data as shown in Figure 8, is calculated by combining 
apprehensions with turn backs, then dividing the number by the total of apprehensions, turn 
backs, and got-aways.110 DHS defines apprehensions as removable aliens arrested by 
USBP; got-aways are “those that make an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, 
and are no longer pursued by USBP”; while turn backs are subjects who attempt illegal 
entry but give up, return to their origin, and are not apprehended.111  
 
Figure 8. Known Flow Data/The Effectiveness Rate112 
The known-flow method has a few drawbacks, however, starting with the fact that 
it excludes undetected entry, which exaggerates the effectiveness of enforcement.113 
Secondly, since the data is not collected by individual biometrics and is instead based on 
the event of capturing, there is a chance of double counting.114 Finally, due to the variation 
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of reporting got away and turn-back data between sectors, the rate cannot be compared 
among them.115 The most recent DHS report recognizes the shortcomings of the 
effectiveness rate but states that it is the only tool available for analysis of sector-level 
security until further developments are made.116 
2. The Recidivism Rate 
The recidivism rate also began in the 1990s and has been used by DHS with 
improvements in accuracy enabled by the introduction of biometric systems.117 The intent 
behind the recidivism rate is that border effectiveness shows improvement when the rate 
goes down, implying that individuals who are caught are less likely to try again. The rate, 
as shown in Figure 9, is calculated by dividing the number of individual subjects 
apprehended multiple times by the total number of individual subjects apprehended within 
the same year.118  
 
Figure 9. The Recidivism Rate119 
The issues with the recidivism rate as a measure of performance come from the 
multiple factors that are not accounted for. The first is the sheer distance that different 
migrants have to travel. Economic drivers that cause migration from countries other than 
Mexico require a much longer distance to travel and will drop the recidivism rate even 
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though security is unchanged.120 Second, since apprehension is required to gather data, a 
decrease in the recidivism rate could technically be caused by a decrease in the 
apprehension rate.121 Finally, the increased intensity in enforcement over time could 
increase both apprehension and deterrence rates, which would muddy the results since the 
offset would cause no change in the recidivism rate.122 DHS recognizes these mentioned 
issues as well as recommendations by GAO for improvement, but states in the most recent 
metrics report that the annual recidivism rate is a useful measure of performance.123 
3. Migrant Surveys 
Migrant surveys have been conducted by outside agencies regarding border security 
since 1987 through surveys conducted by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) which is 
a binational effort led by scholars in Mexico and the United States.124 DHS uses survey 
data to calculate deterrence as well as the cost of coyote services as a measure of 
performance.125 According to DHS, deterrence is the estimated portion of immigrants who 
have unsuccessfully attempted entry, are from that point deterred from reattempting, and 
either return to their place of origin or remain in Mexico.126 Agents gather data from 
deportees at reparation facilities and ask them “about their intentions to return to the United 
States within the next 7–90 days”; the responses correlate to a level of changes in 
deterrence over a period of time.127 The data for the cost of smuggling services, also known 
as coyote fees, is gathered from surveys and interviews conducted by USBP.128 Survey 
data has many limitations regarding the sample pools and trustworthiness of the 
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interviewees. When the sample only includes apprehended individuals, Mexican nationals, 
or those already living in the United States, the information will be skewed.129 Those 
surveyed about coyote services may be reluctant to mention the use of the service or 
provide details on the payment process.130 DHS currently uses surveys and interviews for 
the deterrence rate as the only way to measure the intentions of immigrants to make future 
illegal entry attempts.131 
4. Asset Assists 
In 2014, GAO recommended that CBP develop a performance metric capable of 
displaying the contributions surveillance technologies have on border security, called asset 
assists.132 Asset assists are documented when technology or other assets such as working 
dog teams or sensor systems assist with the capture of an individual attempting illegal 
entry.133 The intent for asset assist data is to provide decision-makers with a clear 
understanding of changes in apprehensions before and after the placement of 
technology.134 If this plan were to be implemented correctly, it would ease the concern of 
huge enforcement expenditures authorized by Congress without properly accounting for 
the effectiveness of the resources.135  
However, after GAO analyzed asset assist data from 2014 to 2017, they discovered 
numerous discrepancies. First, agents repeatedly input asset assist data as “other” or even 
attributed assists to technology that was not even installed in the region, such as IFT towers 
in the Rio Grande Valley. After leadership was notified of the discrepancies in 2016, 
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further data analysis showed the same issue was occurring in 2017.136 Second, Border 
Patrol agents were not briefed on how to input data, nor were they briefed on the 
importance of why the data was even being collected. The results of these findings led 
GAO to label the data unreliable; DHS officials stated the collection was only meant to 
satisfy external agency requests and never meant to affect budgeting, planning, or 
performance measurements.137 
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IV. INTRODUCING RED TEAMING 
Though the name “red teaming” is new, the concept has been used by NATO for 
years under the name of “alternative analysis,” and by the U.S. Naval War College under 
the title of “war gaming” as far back as 1923.138 Along with the recommendation of 
increased red teaming within the DoD, the 2003 Defense Science Board requested the 
development of a guide and coursework to demonstrate best practices.139 The United 
States released such a guide in 2005 for the University of Foreign Military and Cultural 
Studies (UFMCS), and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence produced a similar guide. 
The guides mostly act as an academic introduction for individuals new to red teaming and 
do not necessarily provide technical guidance for the use of red teaming. The guides assist 
with understanding the history of red teaming, the successful conditions of red teaming, 
how to apply red teaming techniques, and highlighting red teaming’s potential benefits. 
The Ministry of Defence guide defines red teaming as “the independent application 
of a range of structured, creative, and critical thinking techniques to assist the end user in 
making a better-informed decision or produce a more robust product” allowing for a focus 
on system testing.140 The UFMCS defines red teaming with an intellectually focused 
approach as a “function to avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel 
vision in plans and operations; to help staffs avoid making poor assumptions and account 
for the complexity inherent in the Operational Environment.”141 With less of a focus on 
the specific management side that the UFMCS has, the 2003 DoD Science Board report 
and the U.K. guides provide the better outline for a productive red team, one that DHS can 
learn from.  
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A. EFFECTIVE RED TEAMING 
Effective red teaming requires the end user to fully support the team and be open 
to using the products in future decision making.142 Red teaming only works in an 
atmosphere that accepts and values critiques for improvement.143 According to Zenko, 
institutions that are unable to accept or utilize a red team’s findings are better off not 
performing a test in the first place. He believes the top levels of leadership need to provide 
proper direction, offer adequate resources, and ensure that the rest of the organization 
values the red team as well; if this does not occur, the entire process will more than likely 
be ignored.144 It is expected that issues raised will not be welcome to the organization, and 
leadership top cover is required to guarantee that red teams have the required level of 
independence and that their outputs are seriously considered.145 The end user of red team 
outputs establishes the parameters that the team should stay within from the beginning, not 
as an afterthought.146  
1. Effective Red Teaming Development 
There are three steps in developing effective red teaming. The first step is to identify 
the specific task the team needs to accomplish at an initial state. Red teams are typically 
used after problems have already occurred or when there has already been a heavy 
investment in repairing issues, and earlier use could have made changing directions 
easier.147  
The second step for an end user is to identify the appropriate red team and team 
leader who possess the skills necessary to accomplish the task.148 Team member quality, 
the team synergy, and a shared vision are the most important factors in red team 
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performance.149 According to Zenko, red teamers need to be: 1.) creative, confident, open-
minded, and a “little odd,” while still able to communicate well with the targeted 
organization; and 2.) “Have a big bag of tricks,” as variety is essential to red teaming. When 
methods used by the team are predictable or already well known within the organization, 
they have little to no effect. Red teamers need to be able to adapt quickly and be ready to 
use new tactics and techniques.150 The Ministry of Defence guide states that red teams 
should be composed of “critical thinkers, subject matter experts, analysts, cultural advisors, 
and role players with a team size that appropriately matches the assigned task.”151  
The third step is to task and provide freedom of decision making to the red team 
leader. The red team leader needs to be at least semi-independent to perform assessments 
effectively.152 More specifically, the leader needs the freedom to run the team with 
techniques he or she deems appropriate that may include attacking the given issue from 
angles not originally identified by management.153  
2. Ineffective Red Teaming 
According to the DoD, typical causes of failures include the red team not taking its 
assignment seriously, usually due to not being provided a clear objective; losing 
independence by just trying to meet the end user’s personal goal; destroying the integrity 
of the process by leaking information during the test phase; not performing the role of an 
adversary adequately by mirror imaging abilities; and simply not providing interesting 
challenges to the blue side, whether due to lack of skill or overbearing constraints.154  
The amount of red teaming an organization requires is not easily defined. Red 
teaming should be performed often enough to detect and address emerging vulnerabilities 
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but not so often that it is disruptive to the organization and its employees, or does not allow 
enough time to make adjustments to previous findings between tests.155 The three “golden 
rules” of successful red teaming according to the U.K. guide are 1.) timeliness, to be useful 
to the end user, which also meets the aforementioned performance measure; 2.) quality, to 
retain the red team’s credibility and make the final report useful, also meeting a 
performance measure; and 3.) access, as findings should be presented to the correct level 
to influence proper decision making.156  
B. RED TEAMING IN PRACTICE: PHYSICAL PENETRATION  
By implementing physical and simulated penetration testing at the border both 
before and after deployment of technology, DHS can provide immediate data to 
policymakers that demonstrates its effectiveness, as well as war game potential adversarial 
tactics provided by the intelligence community.  
Physical penetration testing is conducted in four phases. First, the team begins by 
simply scoping out the engagement area or targeted institution. Second, information is 
gathered by active reconnaissance of the building or, in the case of the border, a targeted 
region. Third, the team conducts the actual penetration of the targeted area. Finally, the 
team presents the findings and a prioritized list of recommendations to the organization’s 
leadership.157 Physical penetration tests are used to prove that an organization’s security 
measures have inadequacies that can be bypassed through challenging untested 
assumptions, finding strategic blind spots, and uncovering security weaknesses.158  
The FAA initiated physical penetration testing by red teams in 1991 as a response 
to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 to identify shortfalls in airport security.159 
Most of the penetration tests were conducted by a red team member, known only to 
management, attempting to circumvent security by smuggling dangerous components 
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through airport security. If a team member was detected, he or she could quickly provide 
documentation of the test and be cleared. Throughout the 1990s, the teams discovered a 
wide range of security deficiencies at every airport they tested, including the Frankfurt 
International Airport where 44 of 44 of their smuggling attempts were successful in 1996, 
the same airport the Pan Am 103 flight originated from.160  
Tests were continued after 9/11 by the GAO, which conducted multiple tests at 
airports, border points of entry, and government buildings directed by Congress under the 
authority of the comptroller general.161 Using the information available to the general 
public, the GAO was able to smuggle radioactive material through ports of entry at the 
border in 2006, though it was deemed a nearly immeasurable amount.162 The GAO team 
was also able to smuggle bomb components through 19 airports in 2009, into 10 of 10 
federal buildings in 2009, and a major seaport in 2011.163 Further tests by GAO between 
2003 and 2007 showed weaknesses at CBP’s ports of entry, where the teams used 
fraudulent documents to gain access to the United States, but the team rarely tested security 
between them.164  
What DHS can learn from the physical penetration tests is the importance of top 
cover and responses to findings. A red team is expected to raise concerns that are 
unwelcome but require support from top-level management to be implemented.165 The 
FAA red team accomplished its mission by annotating over 400 pages’ worth of 
discrepancies, but very few suggestions were implemented until after 9/11.166  
The lack of implementation was not due to an absence of notification attempts by 
the red team leadership. Notifications of findings originated through the FAA chain of 
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command up to the FAA administrator, and eventually the secretary of transportation in 
1998. After further recognition that no action was taking place, the red team leadership 
briefed the DOT inspector general, GAO investigators, and Congressional staffers 
throughout 1999 and 2000. Finally, the red team leadership resorted to threatening their 
own employer with formalized a whistleblower disclosure to the Office of Special Council 
that the FAA was a threat to public safety.167  
C. RED TEAMING IN PRACTICE: MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Not all red teaming is done by actual teams in the field. Often, red teaming is 
performed using modeling and simulation tools that can be cheaper and yet still effective 
in determining the effectiveness of security systems. 
1. Computational Red Teaming 
One form of model and simulation is Computational Red Teaming (CRT), which 
takes the concept of physical penetration tests with humans and builds it into a computer 
program capable of creating similar results through repeated simulations. A study 
performed at Curtin University in Perth, Australia on computational red teaming described 
the motivations for CRT as the need to discover vulnerabilities, reveal biases, learn about 
competitors, create a database for events, and unlearn previous practices to learn new 
ones.168 The computing and engineering students developed a simulation wherein a red 
team would attempt physical entry of a building protected by security systems and a set 
number of blue team guards in order to perform a physical security assessment of the 
building. The results from each battle are analyzed and used for improvements in both 
defensive and offensive capabilities.169  
The model building was designed after a real building, much like DHS would use 
real terrain features in their model. The simulated red team was given a set number of tools 
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to bypass the physical barriers, ranging from rocks to electric drills and explosives.170 The 
simulation was based on the attack-defend model wherein the red team attempts the first 
attack, and the blue team adjusts its defenses accordingly before the next round. The blue 
team made adjustments such as hardening certain walls, repositioning surveillance systems 
and even hiring more guards to counter each red team move.171 One surprising outcome 
of the tests was the ability of the red team to find new paths unseen by the blue team each 
time the blue team attempted to adapt to previous attacks that did seem obvious. This 
removal of biases that enables the discovery of possibilities and vulnerabilities while 
providing a useful database for future events are key reasons why CRTs have been applied 
in both military and non-military capacities.172  
The measures of effectiveness from the simulations were derived from the amount 
of time the red team was delayed on each attempt by the changes that the blue team made 
to security.173 Instead of showing delays as the measure of effectiveness, DHS could 
quickly determine effectiveness through detection rates in a similar model. The results of 
the test also traced the specific attack paths taken by the red team, which would assist in 
explaining the need for surveillance technology in a given area. When the system was set 
to run continual tests without human involvement, the outcomes consistently tapped into a 
space of unexplored possibilities and discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the physical 
security of the facility.174 
2. The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation Software 
A prominent system used in red team simulations is the Joint Conflict and Tactical 
Simulation (JCATS) software. JCATS was introduced by the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) and is the primary ground maneuver simulation model used 
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by the U.S. Army and NATO.175 While typically used as a training simulator and in 
military exercises, JCATS has been used for simulating facility and border security 
scenarios; emergency management response scenarios; and testing new technology 
effectiveness with integration into military tactics.176 JCATS accurately simulates all 
sensor and weapon systems, as well as ground, sea, and air vehicles, including those found 
along the United States southern border.177  
A key advantage for DHS using JCATS as a simulation model is its ability to create 
a playfield based on actual terrain. The software pulls terrain data from the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and develops a 3D field that is capable of being viewed 
accurately down to a one-meter level.178 The different soil types, vegetation, and bodies 
of water change the characteristics of the map as well as how a simulated player moves, 
sees, and shoots.179 Player visibility is further simulated by the inclusion of day and night 
inputs, moon or no moon, and tunnels, all of which significantly impact surveillance 
technology and Border Patrol agent detection capabilities. 
D. PHYSICAL PENETRATION VS. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
As shown in their 2009 red team study, Sandia National Laboratories is an advocate 
for both physical and simulated red teaming events, but a cost-benefit analysis is necessary 
to determine the correct method.180 Since a red team is typically charged with covering a 
broad environment and emulating all likely attacks, two limiting factors are time and 
funding. According to Sandia, the answer to this issue as well as improving red team 
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effectiveness is modeling and simulation.181 Modeling and simulation simulates force-on-
force interplay by incorporating complex and adaptive human behaviors into a simulated 
3D environment and is a tool that can be used by red teams to be more effective when 
developing plans.182 When comparing live red teams to red team models and simulation, 
the pros and cons of each end up making the team more effective when used together. The 
live red teams perform better in areas such as the breadth of knowledge and creativity, 
while the models and simulations perform better with wide ranges of possibilities, 
measurable results, and potentially costs. The final recommendations of the study led to 
the decision that red team model and simulation 1.) should not substitute human red teams 
but instead augment them by providing new capabilities and improved analysis; 2.) should 
be used to capture human red team information and utilize it more broadly at less of an 
expense; and 3.) use the broad possibilities to direct human red teams where further testing 
is needed.183 
Other academic research from Operational Research students has been conducted 
using simulations to improve border security as well. In his Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis, Bahri Yildiz used a simulation tool called Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA) to specifically test the improvements small unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAS) 
made to border security.184 Much like what can be done in JCATS, Yildiz replaced the 
Border Patrol agent kill range to signify a capture and utilized interlinked sensors in the 
play area to communicate the detection of an alien and initiate the agent’s movement to an 
area.185 In his final comments, Yildiz found that SUAS technology did improve agent 
detection and apprehension as well as determine the most effective placement of the 
assets.186 The findings also proved that even with surveillance technology improvements, 
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the most crucial asset in border protection is the availability and mobility of individual 
agents.187 While detection is important, physical apprehension is what completes the 
mission. When Turkish Army Operational Research students performed simulation models 
to analyze Turkey’s border, they obtained similar results. The intention for their simulation 
was to find the most cost-effective border security system that integrated surveillance 
technology and border patrols. The findings showed that technology such as thermal 
imaging improved patrol capability, but the most critical factor was effective 
communication and the ability to respond with mobile patrols.188 
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V. FAA LESSONS LEARNED FOR SIMULATIONS 
The following chapter provides a recommendation based on a pre-9/11 FAA red 
team case study for other red teams to follow in the development, management, and use of 
outcomes. As briefly described in the previous chapter, the FAA red team was established 
in 1991 in response to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 that killed 270 people.189 
While their findings were often not employed, the planning, techniques, and team makeup 
provide a basic outline for a red team to be used at the U.S. southern border. 
A. RED TEAM DEVELOPMENT 
Red team development starts with choosing the correct players for the team and 
ensuring they are capable of handling the positions challenges. The selected red team 
members must also be able to develop a character profiles independently to perform as the 
backbone of real-world simulations. 
1. Choosing the Players 
When feasible, red team participants should not be recruited from within the ranks 
of the organization being tested for two reasons. One, having too much insider knowledge 
on operations will alter the realistic decision making of the red team; and two, the 
likelihood of not providing sensitive simulation information to colleagues is low due to the 
individual loyalties still being tied to performance of their own agency. Individuals with a 
background in law enforcement or military operations share the same values as those trying 
to capture them and are less likely to act in the same manner a person trying to cross the 
border illegally would.190 In rare cases such as the U.S. Navy Red Cell made up of SEAL 
team members in the mid-1980s, military members can be successful red teamers. Though 
the team completed the role of penetrating U.S. naval bases and spreading destruction for 
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training purposes, internal issues and political fallout led to the program’s end in 1992.191 
To back up this theory, the original FAA red team was completely independent of the 
FAA’s regulatory oversight of airport and airline security and was able to plan most of 
their actions independently.192 More recently, the inspection teams are directly tied to TSA 
under the Office of Inspection (OI) and have been labeled as “testing regiments that fit 
within the confines of bureaucratic needs.”193  
The individuals selected for the red team are also expected to work under 
challenging conditions. Quite often, red team members are required to work well beyond 
the 9–5 schedule and must be prepared to go long periods without a resupply of food and 
water. The teams remain small and are not expected to exceed 12 members at a time, 
depending on the simulation. The most effective red teams adapt to these challenges and 
try to feel and think like adversaries by taking transformative steps to take on 
characteristics of the adversary and develop skills to work as a team.194 The FAA red team 
averaged no more than four to five elite agents at a time.195 
2. Character Development 
Current simulation techniques need to focus on the needs of red team creation and 
how to get red team members into their roles for that team to mirror the behavior, actions, 
and specific levels of sophistication of a threat group for simulation purposes. Role players 
in red team operations are often required to write out their character history and ideological 
views that help them get into character.196 The FAA red team members received routine 
top-secret intelligence assessments of terror groups from both the FBI and CIA and used 
the information as a basis for emulating terrorist activities. The team was mandated to 
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simulate how terrorists were believed to operate and to do covert testing of the security 
procedures the airline industry was supposed to implement.197  
To plan effectively for red team role-playing, preparation is essential to understand 
the feelings and thoughts of the adversary fully. For the character portrayal to seem real, 
each team member must work to develop their characters independently.198 By developing 
individual characters, the red team members avoid the common pitfall of generalizing a 
role with no specific characteristics and are portrayed as unreal.199 
Two fundamental principles of character development are observing other people 
who are similar to the desired character profile and analyzing your character by asking and 
answering specific questions.200 Examples of observing people are merely mimicking the 
posture, gestures, and expressions, as well as the way the person walks, sits and eats. If the 
red team members neglect this portion of characterizing and are noticed before even 
moving into position, the validity of the scenario results would quickly be reduced. Much 
like any law enforcement agency that sees a scenario developing before the official 
announcement, the Border Patrol agents will soon know that something out of the ordinary 
is happening and begin preparing in advance. To take the character development even 
further, red team members need to answer specific questions that effectively build the role. 
A few example features to question include physical traits, such as posture, gait, 
appearance and gestures; social characteristics, such as economic status, habitual 
behaviors, and friendships; as well as psychological traits, such as attitude, motivations, 
and dislikes; and finally intentions, and how the character will go about achieving the 
intended goals.201 
To complete the character profile, highly detailed questions should be addressed as 
well; examples of these questions are in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Specific Questions in Character Development202 
How old am I? Where was I raised and educated? 
What were the social and economic 
conditions of my family? 
What are my hobbies, pastimes, and 
recreations? 
What might I habitually carry with me? Am I married, and do I have children? 
If I work, what is my employment? What are my skills and training? 
How much does my character hide or 
reveal about myself? 
What is my knowledge of weapons and 
tactics? 
How committed am I to my cause? Have I served prison time? 
Am I mentally stable? If religious, how devout am I? 
Has my upbringing, training, or influences 
caused a cultural hatred? 
What are some items indicative of my 
culture? 
What is my native language? What are the cultural norms to be aware 
of? 
 
After character development is complete, the red team members move into the 
practice phase of characterization with improvisation. The following techniques enable 
individuals with minimal acting experience to become a group of believable characters and 
therefore create a realistic simulation:  
1. Do not contradict the flow of the scenario and remain within the context.  
2. Do not contradict another character in the situation. Instead, give up your 
ideas and go along with what is happening. Failure to do this only prevents 
forward momentum.  
3. Do not break character for any reason other than safety reasons or formal 
ending of the scenario.203 By practicing these rules as a group before the 
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actual scenarios, the red team will become a convincing whole instead of a 
group of individuals.204 
3. Conducting the Simulation 
The next section discusses simulations from the development phase to the 
documentation of findings. Simulations are complicated by nature in that they test players 
and equipment in a manner that is as close to reality as possible; the sense of reality as 
described in the following FAA scenarios are what make them different than similar 
exercises.  
a. Simulation vs. Exercise 
Red team simulations are different than typical exercises in that they ensure a level 
of realism that mimics real events instead of an intellectual challenge. Exercises are 
designed to place emotional or mental strain that goes beyond standard functions and are 
meant to test the participant’s capabilities. When these added stressors come into play, it 
is difficult to evaluate the results of the exercise.205 In contrast, real-world simulations 
with red teams create an environment that occurs just as it should, and therefore, the results 
are not less debatable and thrown into the realm of unrealistic.206 Exercises require a 
certain level of scripting, which leads to a higher level of routine actions and reactions, 
particularly in those who have previously participated in the given exercise. In unscripted 
simulations, the participant’s uncertainty benefits the scenario and better simulates an 
actual incident.207  
When it comes to simulations, smaller is better. Largescale exercises quickly lose 
focus on the original intent of testing and correcting, and move towards long planning 
phases that lose focus. In many instances, the planning phases are bureaucratized and focus 
on the responding forces rather than the opposing force and their ability to defeat the 
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countermeasures in place.208 Planning for the FAA simulations consisted of the red team 
developing a fifteen to twenty-page operational plan that detailed the movements, timeline, 
and objectives of the participating red team members.209 
The higher level of monitoring required by formal exercises is another issue. The 
presence of too many observers, and the intentional or unintentional control, removes 
valuable findings from the outcome and takes the control away from the participants. There 
are few things more disruptive to a scenario than several controllers wearing reflective 
vests or insignias standing around the environment. The visual interference brought on by 
the controllers blurs the line between actuality and training so much that reality is 
essentially eliminated.210 
Exercises are typically preannounced, sometimes even with a safety briefing and 
initiated by a declaration of a scenario such as a hostage situation or a bomb being detected. 
When a simulation begins, there is no preannouncement, and the responding players are 
required to assess the situation on their own instead of having it predetermined. This test 
of assessment is not always performed in exercises, and it is common for participants not 
to know how to react and initiate the remaining phases of response, such as calling for 
reinforcements. A poor management call for the FAA red team was the inability to self-
task and decide where to conduct vulnerability assessments. To complete an evaluation, 
the team had to receive written permission from senior officials within the FAA. The team 
was supposed to operate with no-notice inspections per the 1996 requirement, but in reality, 
they were required to notify U.S. embassies if operating overseas and were never allowed 
to interfere with daily airport operations.211 Though the simulations were intended to be 
unannounced, there were instances of the tests becoming corrupted by FAA administrators 
tipping off local FAA security managers about upcoming inspections. Written 
documentation proved instances where equipment such as CTX explosive machines was 
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turned on and operated only during the red team’s tests.212 Other issues occurred, such as 
FAA administrators interfering with the red team reporting honestly about the reliability of 
new imaging software programs. 
Mandatory exercises tend to focus on “checking the box” to fulfill a requirement 
set forth by the given agency. Having this mentality prevents the red team from fulfilling 
its role in playing out highly realistic scenarios. The most essential point Sloan makes is 
that simulations should be as close as possible to the organizational, physical, emotional, 
and tactical demands that a real attack has.213 
b. FAA Red Team Simulations 
The FAA red team conducted simulations ranging from simple bag-match 
violations to high-risk smuggling operations. In the bag-violation simulations, a red team 
member would check two bags for a flight and never actually board it while documenting 
the results. Other simple tests would involve the member walking around on the tarmac 
and waiting for a security guard or ground crew to notice while timing the response. The 
riskier tests would include smuggling fake bombs, weapons, and even unauthorized 
personnel onto airplanes.  
One example of a bomb-smuggling simulation by the FAA red team was Operation 
Marco Polo in 1996. The red team planned and conducted 44 bomb-smuggling attempts at 
the Frankfurt International Airport, and not one was detected. The scenario played out with 
red team member A placing bagged bomb components onto the x-ray conveyor belt within 
eyesight of red team member B. As the bag made its way through the x-ray, member B 
would call member A to walk by the screen as the pack went across. While the bomb 
components were visible, the distraction took the x-ray attendants’ eyes off the screen 
every time. If any of the bombs were to be detected, the red team members were to provide 
credentials and inform the baggage handlers that they were part of an assessment. As no 
bomb components were ever detected, this action was never necessary. The findings from 
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those scenarios proved that the lack of detection was not necessarily a lack of technological 
sophistication but simply that the baggage screeners were not watching the monitors.214 
In another simulation, the red team performed a test for a local Fox news affiliate 
wherein prohibited weapons passed through Terminal B of the Boston Logan International 
Airport. The simulation aired on May 6, 2001, and the findings were hand-delivered to the 
office of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, but the red team leadership never received 
a response. Just a few months later, Mohamed Atta of the 9/11 hijackers performed a 
surveillance run of the Logan International Airport. On September 11, United Airlines 175 
and American Airlines 11 departed Terminal B at Logan International Airport and flew 
into the World Trade Center towers.215 
4. Guiding the Simulation 
From the time of initiation in 1991, the FAA red team struggled to make an impact 
on airport and airline security due to a lack of acceptance from the FAA. The group was 
founded in response to a clear need but had no mission statement or guidance document to 
provide conduct of the operations, the scope of activities, or the expected use of the 
findings.216 After approximately five years, however, the requirement for the FAA 
administrator to “conduct periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of 
airports to determine the effectiveness of such systems” was signed into law in 1996. While 
this requirement was still vague, it provided a formal need for the FAA red team. The 
remainder of this section builds on these lessons from the FAA team’s experience to 
suggest practices that red teams should attempt to follow 
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a. Simulation Mission and Intent 
The scenario should be created comparable to what the common threat is in the 
given jurisdiction. Therefore, the target selection, OPFOR group size, tools used, and attack 
methods need to be formed as realistically as possible.217 
One question to ask before executing the scenario is what part of the timetable is 
the simulation focused on: pre-incident, trans-incident, or post-incident?218 If the red 
teamers are detected during the planning phase and questioned by the blue team before 
attempting the desired action, that information may go in the after action report (AAR) as 
a positive remark, but will not actually provide any results for other measures of 
effectiveness. Another question is, will the scenario come to a close after the capture or kill 
has taken place? Or will those who make it to a predetermined goal call in for the end of 
the scenario? In the case of this the FAA red team, the simulations were only meant to test 
the screening capability and security of the airport, therefore ending the tests immediately 
after passing through security. 
Another question involves the area of focus in which the scenario will take place. 
While the details of the play area should be briefed to the red team, other aspects of the test 
should remain within as tight a circle as possible. For safety concerns, it is essential to pre-
brief respondents that there will likely be a scenario, but the exact timeline is not necessary. 
Merely stating that there will be a test of the region within the month of the initial testing 
phase may be enough detail rather than providing an exact day for the test. 
b. Simulation Organizational Requirements 
While over planning is an issue, there is still a requirement for at least some 
planning. Meetings should be minimal for simple scenarios and occur over the course of a 
few hours instead of days.219 
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Once the operation is planned at the management levels above the border patrol 
agents on the ground, the simulation operations order must be secure from that point 
forward. Only the liaison officers finalizing the scenario should know the details; even the 
red team should be kept unaware of certain information. The actual red team members 
should not be provided information beyond what their scenario personas would know about 
the targeted venue. Insider knowledge beyond what a typical adversary would have 
significantly dictates the red team’s actions during both during the planning phase and the 
actual simulation execution.220 
Once the simulation plan (SimPlan) is created, the plan must be treated as law 
enforcement sensitive because of the information contained within it. If a well-devised plan 
and the results of the scenario were to fall into the wrong hands, the capabilities could be 
exploited by real-world adversaries. The standard SimPlan contains the following 
categories described in Table 2.  
Table 2. SimPlan Categories221 
Simulation 
Information 
Time, date, location, and duration 
Goals  Training to take place and the benefits 
Objectives The delineation of what will actually be evaluated or assessed in 
the training 
Narrative The general storyline that the simulation will follow (the less rigid 
the better) 
Participants Who is involved: coordinators, liaisons, red team members, 
observers, etc.  
Command and 
control 
Description of information flow and who has authority in 
simulation components 
Red team plan Red team mission and how it will be attained  
Blue team plan A declaration from the responding department or standard 
operating procedures already in place 
                                                 
220 Sloan, 39. 




Time, date, location, and duration 
Equipment list Checklist of items used in the simulation 
Safety and security 
measures 
Description of how the participants and local residents will be 
protected from harm as well as protocols for emergencies 
Evaluation method The specified feedback loop to critique the outcome of the 
simulation and pass on findings through the designated channels 
Ad Hoc  A recommendation list of final planning considerations for 
participants that satisfy human needs such as food, water, batteries, 
first aid kits, etc. 
 
c. Three Phases of Simulation 
All simulations will go through three primary phases that should not be skipped or 
intentionally overlooked: pre-simulation, trans-simulation, and post-simulation.222 
The pre-simulation phase consists of getting all of the participants in their correct 
places and in the appropriate mindset. A brief is typically given to provide the basic 
guidelines and intent behind the simulation. Though the simulation is meant to demonstrate 
realism, it is essential to incorporate safety protocols, simulation boundaries, actions upon 
a family emergency, and equipment checks. The participants must also develop an agreed-
upon method to start and stop the simulation before moving into positions.223 
Upon initiation of the simulation, the trans-simulation phase begins. All of the 
deliberate actions take place during this phase and are usually closely monitored by the 
scenario controllers. To meet the intent of keeping the simulation as realistic as possible, it 
may be necessary to remove the ground controllers and have monitors for emergency 
response only within radio or cell phone contact.  
The post simulation begins when the previously agreed upon stand-down order is 
given, or there is a serious safety incident. The after-action brief should be given as soon 
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as possible after the conclusion of the simulation. Lessons learned and candid performance 
critiques are proven to make learning experiences more valuable; as more time passes, the 
participants get out of character and begin to intellectualize their responses making them 
less realistic.224  
d. Safety Measures 
The middle ground between a safe scenario and a real scenario is a fine line. Efforts 
should be made to avoid unnecessary danger without creating an overly bureaucratic 
checklist approach. A few considerations to brief the red team in a border security scenario 
are as follows: 1.) No use of booby trap techniques such as fishing line or any weapons to 
counter the border patrol agents; 2.) Upon capture, you will provide the predetermined 
documentation of red team affiliation, and there will be no attempt to resist arrest or employ 
force to escape; 3.) Do not fake an injury as a means of being released; if there is a real-
world emergency, further actions must be taken seriously. 
e. Measuring the Outcome 
Simulations tend to become politicized where the law enforcement officers or 
military members want to appear well prepared to higher-level authorities and flexible, 
unpredictable scenarios are not practiced to allow the good guys to win consistently.225 In 
some cases, hot washes and lessons-learned meetings are not held with candid feedback. 
After-action reports must be developed and acted upon with sensitivity to rank and politics 
left out as much as possible.226 All participants should be allowed to explain their 
impressions of the scenario. The debrief should not turn into a session of congratulations 
on how well the scenario went but focus on the lessons learned to annotate the real 
outcomes.227 
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f. Documentation of Findings 
Documentation of findings after completed FAA simulations were shared in the 
form of written reports to the associate administrator for Civil Aviation Security (CAS). 
The data within the reports would be shared with the CAS field units responsible for 
implementing the follow-on remedial actions that should be taken. However, 
communication was limited, red team findings were never shared directly with airport 
officials, and the red team was never given responses to the reports.228  
Where the FAA failed in using the red team was a response to the findings. Many 
of the exact problems found during the early 1990s were found in the same airports as late 
as 2001; nothing was being done.229 A couple of reasons the FAA red team’s findings 
were not being implemented come from 1.) not having a system in place to adequately 
disseminate and track simulation results and 2.) the administrator of CAS deliberately 
suppressing or covering up the findings from the tests. As Zenko says, “The pre-9/11 FAA 
red team is a cautionary tale of the extreme peril of failing to heed a red team’s 
findings.”230 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a summary overview of the thesis, recommendations for CBP 
to use for red teaming as an added measure of surveillance technology effectiveness, 
recommendations for further research, and a conclusion of the research.  
This thesis asked the following questions: What technologies are currently utilized 
for border security and how can their effectiveness be measured? How can red teaming be 
used to improve existing measures of effectiveness? The answer to the first question is 
fulfilled by Chapters I–III, which discuss the current technology at the border and the 
history of methods used to measure them—for example, the recidivism and apprehension 
rates. The answer to the second question is demonstrated in Chapters IV–V by describing 
red teaming, the previous uses of red teaming as measures of effectiveness, and through 
the case study of the pre- 9/11 red team. To answer this question for CBP specifically, this 
chapter will provide a recommendation based on the research of red teaming discussed in 
the previous two chapters.  
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II provides the background of the immigration enforcement system and the 
significant changes that have occurred to make it as large as it is today. To demonstrate the 
need for measures of effectiveness, the chapter describes the ever-changing and long 
history of measurements of effectiveness at the border beginning as early as 1892. The 
majority of current measurement methods have been developed over the last two decades, 
but the unreliable apprehension rate is the one most commonly used. Finally, the chapter 
describes the importance of measurements and the key components that should be a part of 
useful measures.  
Chapter III provides a contemporary depiction of the southern border by discussing 
the variety of programs implemented to improve technology in recent history and the 
primary methods DHS uses to measure effectiveness. The most current program, the 
Southwest Border Technology Plan, is described in further detail to provide the reader with 
an understanding of the technology in question. Finally, the chapter describes the methods 
62 
of measurement and analyzes the use of their outputs as proper measures of security 
technology effectiveness.  
Chapter IV introduces red teaming as another option for measuring effectiveness 
and describes its brief history, essential elements, as well as its variety of uses, whether 
they be physical penetration or computer-generated simulations. While physical 
penetration provides the more useable results, its expensive and complicated nature make 
running computer-generated simulations desirable as well, especially when the simulations 
can be run hundreds of times at little to no extra cost. Analysis of the two categories of 
uses showed that a combination of the two might provide the most efficient method.  
Chapter V goes into further detail on red teaming by describing the creation and 
implementation of real-world simulations. With the pre-9/11 red team as a case study, this 
chapter provides details on important aspects of developing a simulation, executing the 
simulation, and briefing the results to policy makers capable of using the data correctly.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated in Chapter IV, the steps to effective red teaming include identifying the 
specific task, building an appropriately empowered team for the task, conducting the 
simulation, and delivering the findings. This section uses the simulation techniques and 
case study findings from earlier chapters to develop a concept, based on these three steps, 
for how DHS could use a red team for measuring border security technology effectiveness.  
1. Identifying the Specific Task 
The primary goal of red teaming the security technology at the southern border is 
to provide measurements of the technology’s effectiveness in detecting unauthorized 
movement between the ports of entry and the technology’s ability to improve the U.S. 
Border Patrol Agents apprehension capability. While the most straightforward 
measurements would come from taking measures both before and after deployment of the 
technology, this will not always be possible since areas of the border already have various 
components of the Southwest Border Technology Plan installed, particularly in Arizona.  
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The primary measurements should be acquired through physical penetration tests; 
for example, apprehension improvements can be calculated by dividing the number of red 
team members apprehended during a simulation by the total number of members who 
attempted entry. Likewise, detection improvements can be calculated by dividing the total 
number of detected red team members by the total number of members who attempted 
entry in the designated area and time of the scenario. However, due to the cost and risks 
involved with physical penetration, further measurements of effectiveness should continue 
to be performed by using modeling and simulation software in the given area. The ability 
to generate accurate maps and input specific surveillance capabilities while simulating 
hundreds of red team attempts can assist DHS in sensor placement or honing in on 
uncovered areas found by the red teams.  
2. The CBP Red Team 
The red team would work directly for the Chief of U.S. Border Patrol and consist 
of 5 to 8 individuals with a designated red team leader position. As mentioned in Chapter 
V, these select individuals should not come from directly within the CBP organization. The 
primary reasons for this are to prevent bias toward U.S. Border Patrol and their mission as 
well as to prevent the red team members from having an unrealistic amount of insider 
knowledge that would factor into the overall realism of the simulation. However, since the 
red team will have access to sensitive information, operate on both sides of the southern 
border, and work in high-risk environments, it will still need to fall within government 
employee status under DHS or GAO, not a private company.  
To prevent corruption of the test results, the red team members should only be 
provided information that is in line with the expected level of knowledge that an individual 
attempting a border crossing would have, such as impassable areas to avoid and preferred 
times of travel. The red team members will be required to perform character development 
to the level described in Chapter V, which will not only add to the realism of the simulation 
but also prevent the players from blowing cover before the actual test can begin. Trained 
Border Patrol agents will quickly spot an out-of-place individual and be able to inform 
other agents that a simulation is likely to occur or they will follow the individual until they 
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attempt to cross the border; both options would throw off realistic levels of agent 
attentiveness and corrupt the test results. 
3. Conducting the Simulation 
The primary goals of the red team simulations are to maintain a realistic setting that 
prevents the dismissal of findings due to a debate on realism while also maintaining the 
safety of the players. Simulations inherently have little to no script and minimal oversight 
as discussed in Chapter V but with teams operating on both sides of a country’s border, 
extensive coordination with Mexican officials will be required. These simulations will have 
no controllers to direct scenario phases, and there will be no preannouncement that a 
simulation is going to take place below the chief of U.S. Border Patrol. These actions are 
designed to prevent information leakage as happened with the FAA red team simulations. 
Border Patrol agents will have already been provided a blanket safety brief for the handling 
of red team operatives and know that the members carry predetermined credentials to verify 
their status. 
The safety of the players will be kept in line with a thorough SimPlan that provides 
specific details of each simulation that includes designated boundaries and prior 
coordinated emergency protocols. With no simulation monitors on site, it will be necessary 
to have emergency services on standby within radio or cell phone contact to respond when 
needed. Other safety concerns such as the use of improvised weapons to aid in the capture 
of or escape by the players will be covered in the blanket brief as well.  
4. The Findings  
To keep the results of the simulations as accurate as possible, the findings should 
not be swayed by the political nature trying to appear better than the actual findings. To 
ensure the conclusions stay true to form, the final AAR should initially be reviewed by 
only the chief of U.S. Border Patrol and the Deputy Commissioner of DHS before moving 
up the chain of command to Congress. Having a designated routing chain will help prevent 
the FAA issues of deliberate suppression of results and the inability to adequately 
disseminate them. The results of the red team simulations will provide apprehension and 
detection rates that compare the same regions before and after the deployment of 
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surveillance technology where possible and compare them to findings in areas that already 
have deployed the technology.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To further develop the usefulness of red teams and their impact on surveillance 
technology at the southern border, this thesis recommends further research be conducted 
into the modelling and simulation side of red teaming and the positive impact it could have 
on improving the capabilities of the technology. Previous NPS theses on red teaming at the 
southern border by the NPS Operations Research department students are either outdated 
due to changes in technology or only focus on one piece of a technology program such as 
small unmanned aerial vehicles. By inputting the data gathered from this research for the 
Southwest Border Technology Plan in Chapter III and combining it with a more modern 
simulator such as JCATS, I believe researchers will uncover improved layouts for the 
surveillance systems and further improve their effectiveness at the southern border.  
D. CONCLUSION 
With the consistent failures and the inability of DHS to accurately measure 
performance with indirect methods, the more direct method of red teaming requires 
consideration. Red teaming is an approach used extensively in military exercises to find 
gaps and vulnerabilities just as it is with developing resilience in critical infrastructure. 
Challenging new technologies with dedicated red teams capable of discovering new ways 
of penetration is vital and a recognized practice by many organizations to test security 
technology and measures.231 By developing scenarios designed to test technology 
capabilities at the border, DHS may be able to effectively demonstrate areas needing 
improvement and provide substance for resource requests in those regions. To ensure new 
technology performs over time, red teaming provides designers information on how 
technology under development can be circumvented, allowing designers to adapt in the 
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process.232 There is always the potential for adversaries to defeat technology soon after its 
implementation, and testing the systems before large-scale procurement is a necessity.233 
Aggressive red teams are capable of challenging operational concepts and discovering 
weaknesses before real threats do.234 
By developing scenarios designed to test technology capabilities at the border, DHS 
can more effectively demonstrate areas needing improvement and provide substance for 
resource requests in the regions that need further development. Red teams offer the user an 
ability to improve plans and make decisions through quantitative factors such as specific 
technology and geography, as well as qualitative factors of perspectives and reactions.235 
According to the U.K. Ministry of Defence, red teaming provides benefits in understanding 
the operational environment; testing a system, plan, or view through the eyes of an 
adversary; measuring impacts of external influences to adversaries; assessing security and 
technology through identifying vulnerabilities, risks, and threats; and most importantly, 
finding additional or enhanced measures of effectiveness.236 The direct nature of red 
teaming is also more capable than extensive data collection with meeting the widely 
accepted performance measurement requirements of being meaningful, clear, and readily 
understandable; timely and actionable; and stable over time.237 
  
                                                 
232 Jackson, 7. 
233 Jackson, 9. 
234 Department of Defense, The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities, 1. 
235 Ministry of Defence, Red Teaming Guide, 1–6. 
236 Ministry of Defence, 1–6. 
237 BPC, viii. 
67 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2004. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
Abrahamson, Reed. “Fixing the Net: The Fall of SBInet, the Rise of Integrated Fixed 
Towers.” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 25, no. 3 (2011): 743–49. 
Alden, Edward. Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Enforcement. Washington, DC: 
Council on Foreign Relation, 2013. https://cfrd8-
files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/03/Alden_Border_Security_Testimony_0
3-14-13%20-%20Final.pdf. 
Argueta, Carla N. Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry. CRS Report No. 
R44386. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf. 
Blum, Eric. “Further Reflection.” Department of Homeland Security. Accessed August 
26, 2019. https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/frontline-june-az-technology. 
Çelik, Gökhan, and İhsan Sabuncuoğlu. “Simulation Modelling and Analysis of a Border 
Security System.” European Journal of Operational Research 180, no. 3 (August 
2007): 1394–1410. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.040. 
Department of Defense. The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003. 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/redteam.pdf. 
Department of Homeland Security. Department of Homeland Security Border Security 
Metrics Report. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018. 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/BSMR_OIS_2016.pdf. 
———. Efforts by DHS to Estimate Southwest Border Security between Ports of Entry. 
Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017. 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0914_estimates-of-
border-security.pdf. 
Gambler, Rebecca. Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance 
Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-
18-119. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017. 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688666.pdf. 
68 
Jackson, Brian A. Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against 
Diverse and Adaptive Threats. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.pd
f. 
———. Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and 
Adaptive Threats. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.pd
f. 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation 
Capabilities Brief. LLNL-PRES648472. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, 2018. 
https://csl.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/JCATS_Capabilities_Brief-Update-
May2018.pdf. 
Lipton, Eric. “Testers Slip Radioactive Materials Over Borders.” New York Times. 2006. 




Morral, Andrew, Henry Willis, and Peter Brownell. Measuring Illegal Border Crossing 
Between Ports of Entry. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP328.html. 
Moxley, Mitch. “Better Than a Wall: A New Detection System Can Help Monitor the 
U.S.-Mexico Border.” Popular Mechanics, January 28, 2016. 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a18622/border-control-
integrated-towers-system-invisible-wall/. 
Office of Inspector General. CBP’s Border Security Efforts: An Analysis of Southwest 
Border Security Between the Ports of Entry. Washington, DC: Office of Inspector 
General DHS, 2017. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-
17-39-Feb17.pdf. 
Orchard, Paulina. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014. 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf. 
Piscotty, Mark, and Erica Burleson. Conflict Simulation Laboratory Quarterly Review. 
Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2018. 
69 
Poister, Theodore H. Measuring Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations. 




Roberts, Bryan. Measuring the Metrics: Grading the Government on Immigration 
Enforcement. Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2015. 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/BPC_Immigration_MeasuringEnforcement.pdf. 
Rosenblum, Marc R. Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. 
CRS Report No. R42138. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013. https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/R42138.pdf. 
Schroeder, Robert D. Holding the Line in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection. Accessed May 14, 2019. 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Holding%20the%20Line_TRI
LOGY.pdf. 
Skroch, Michael J. “Modeling and Simulation of Red Teaming.” U.S. Department of 
Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information, 2009. 
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/972439-modeling-simulation-red-teaming-part-why-
red-team. 
Sloan, Stephen. Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2011. 
Tan, Terence, Stuart Porter, Tele Tan, and Geoff West. “Computational Red Teaming for 
Physical Security Assessment.” In The 4th Annual IEEE International Conference 
on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent Systems, 258–63, 
2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/CYBER.2014.6917471. 
Tactical Micro. “The Eagle MVSS.” Accessed September 9, 2019. 
http://www.tacticalmicro.com/products/MVSS_CATALOG.pdf. 
University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies. Red Team Handbook. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 2012. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/ufmcs_red_team_handbook_apr2012.
pdf. 
Yildiz, Bahri. “Exploration of the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles along with Other 
Assets to Enhance Border Protection.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2009. 
Zenko, Micah. Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy. New York: 
Basic Books, 2015. 
70 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
